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Your Mind’s Eye:
Metaphor or Reality?
An Exploration of the Varieties of Visual Imagery
By Alia Korot
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I

f you are told to close
your eyes and picture an
apple, what do you see?
Do you actually see an apple?
What color is it? How detailed is
it? Can you taste it? Smell it? Hear
the crunch when you take a bite?
Most people can easily answer
these questions, and being told to
picture something in their mind’s
eye makes perfect sense. However, if you’re like me, you don’t see
anything when asked these questions. I know what an apple looks,
tastes, and smells like, but I do
not relive any of those sensations
when told to picture something.
For me, the mind’s eye has always
been a metaphor, and I only recently realized that my experience
differs from the majority of people.
Like myself, many people
are not even aware of their lack of
imagery, or that it is abnormal until
well into young adulthood. We
rarely describe the details of our
mental experience to others, and
instead assume that others think
and imagine in the same way we
do. With phrases like “picture this”
and “your mind’s eye” so wide-
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spread in our everyday language,
it is assumed that we all interpret
their meaning in the same way.
However, this is not the case, and
recognizing this can help us try to
understand the variety of ways that
people think, imagine, and experience the world around them.

Early Studies of
Aphantasia
The first recorded study of
variations in visual imagery was
conducted by Sir Francis Galton,
a notable 19th century scientist, in
1880, who recognized that some
individuals seemed to lack the
power to visualize. However, this
phenomenon has been mostly
ignored since then, and the term
to describe it was only coined in
2015 (1). This distinct experience
has now been labeled aphantasia,
which is defined as the absence of
voluntary mental imagery. Based
on what we know so far, aphantasia seems to be found in about
1-4% of people, but this number
will likely change as awareness of

the phenomenon grows (2).
The study that first defined
aphantasia was conducted by a
researcher named Rebecca Keogh and her colleagues (2). They
used a survey called the Vividness
of Visual Imagery Questionnaire
(VVIQ), which describes a variety of
situations and asks how clearly you
can visualize them on a scale from
seeing nothing to seeing something as detailed as real vision (this
survey is available to the public
online). The researchers gave this
survey to a group of people who
had self-reported a lifelong lack
of visual imagery. Interestingly,
around half the participants reported a dearth of all types of imagery,, but the majority still reported
experiencing involuntary imagery,
such as “flashes” while awake and
dreaming (1). Personally, I don’t
experience any type of sensory
imagery in my mind, whether that
be visual, auditory, or olfactory.
While I believe I do dream visually,
I rarely (if ever) remember those
dreams.
While this study provided
the first cohesive report of aphan-

The varieties of visual imagery. Image created by Alia Korot with BioRender.com
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tasia as a defined variation in
neuropsychological function, it still
relied on self-reports and observational rather than experimental
methods. This original reliance on
self-reports created some controversy in the scientific community
over whether anyone actually
lacked the ability to visualize, or if
they simply had poor metacognition– meaning they were unaware
of their own visualization. However, various other experiments have
supported that individuals with
aphantasia do indeed lack imagery
capabilities. A test called the binocular rivalry imagery experiment
is one empirical way to measure
the strength of visual imagery. Participants are told to visualize one
of two simple images, then are
very briefly presented with those
two images in a binocular rivalry
display (one image displayed to
each eye, for less than a second),
then asked which image they saw.
Individuals with aphantasia had
significantly lower priming scores,

meaning they were less likely to
preferentially identify the image
they had been previously told to
visualize (3). These results suggest
a much lower vividness and influence of visual imagery, and thus
support the presence of aphantasia.
Another empirical way to
measure visual imagery is through
physiological responses. The
pupillary light reflex is a normal
response in vision where your pupils constrict when you are seeing
something bright. Interestingly,
this reflex also occurs with mental
visual imagery–when imagining
a bright image, your pupils will
constrict. However, when individuals with aphantasia are told to
imagine images of differing brightness, there is no change in their
pupils (2). The normal pupillary
light reflex provides some insight
on the process of visual imagery
itself; namely, that it seems to
function through similar pathways
to normal visual perception. How-

ever, there remain many questions
about how exactly imagery is
formed in the brain.

Understanding
Mental Imagery
Using Brain Imaging
Techniques
Now that we know there
are differences in how well people
can visualize, let’s try to understand exactly what visual imagery is, and how it works. Visual
imagery is used by most people
in many of their day-to-day cognitive processes, such as memory,
planning, spatial navigation, and
reading comprehension. Visual
imagery can be voluntary, as in
many of the prior processes, or
involuntary, such as hallucinations
and intrusive images in disorders
like schizophrenia and PTSD. This
widespread relevance of visual imagery, as well as increasing aware-

Binocular rivalry experiment. Wilbertz G, van Slooten J and Sterzer P, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
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ness of the variations in the ability to visualize, has led to recent
increased investigation into the
neuroscience behind mental imagery. Historically, it has been difficult
to study the neural basis of cognitive processes like mental imagery,
but the growth of functional brain
imaging has created new methods
that allow us to begin to see what
is happening in our brains when
we are told to visualize something.
The most important tool
that is used in this process is
functional magnetic resonance
imaging, or fMRI. This technique is
safe, noninvasive, and allows scientists and doctors to successfully
map and measure brain activity.
Magnetic resonance (MR) is the
emission or absorption of electromagnetic radiation by an atom in
response to a magnetic field. Conducting fMRI on humans involves
exposing them to a magnetic field,
and measuring MR signals from
their brain. Changes in MR signal
are indirectly related to changes in
blood flow, which reflect changes
in neural activity. Thus, when a part
of the brain is more active, there
is more oxygenated blood flow to
this region, so it produces a greater MR signal which can then be
mapped and imaged with fMRI (4).
With this technology, researchers
are able to ask patients to perform
certain cognitive tasks and can
observe the resulting neural activity. This enables us to understand
which parts of the brain are used
for different types of thinking and
tasks.
Through this use of brain
imaging, scientists have further
clarified which areas of the brain
are involved in voluntary visual
imagery. It seems to involve activation of a widespread network
in the brain including areas in
the prefrontal and visual cortices,
similar to those activated in normal visual perception. In vision,
visual information enters the brain

from the eyes, is relayed to the
visual cortex in the occipital lobe,
and then enters multiple streams
of processing and areas of higher-order functioning (that control
thinking, planning, and voluntary
behavior). Visual imagery, on the
other hand, seems to involve a
variety of processes that start at
the higher-order areas of the brain,
and move down to visual areas.
These include decision making,
attentional allocation, language
processing, and accessing longterm memory—all of which eventually lead to a quasi-visual experience (2). Thus, visual perception
and visual imagery seem to utilize
similar brain regions, but the flow
of activation occurs somewhat in
a reverse order, as a more “bottom-up” process for perception
versus a “top-down” process for
mental imagery. Meaning you
consider something in order to
perceive it rather than perceiving
something, and then considering
it.
Amazingly, some detailed
brain imaging studies have made
it possible to identify what someone is imagining based solely on
the pattern of brain activity in their
visual cortex! The level of activity

measured in the visual cortex also
seems to correlate with how vivid
someone reports their imagery to
be (2). These discoveries highlight
how accurately researchers have
been able to pinpoint the roles
of specific brain regions in visual
imagery, though much remains to
be discovered.
Now, with a good understanding of the neural activity
involved in visual imagery, the
next question is how functional
brain imaging can help explain the
differences in the ability to visualize found in aphantasia. The use
of resting state fMRI (in this case,
when the brain is not attempting
to conjure an image) has been
able to successfully elucidate some
of the differences in connectivity
of brain regions between those
with normal imagery, those with
hyperphantasia (ultra-vivid imagery), and those with aphantasia.
Hyperphantasic individuals show
stronger connections between the
visual-occipital network and several prefrontal regions compared to
those with aphantasia, whereas the
aphantasic group shows various
other areas of stronger connectivity. Interestingly, these differences
in connectivity are similar to those
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Neural activation pathways in visual perception vs visual imagery. (A.) depicts the neural activation for the visual
perception of an object out in the world, and (B.) depicts the neural activation for the visual imagination of an
object. Image created by Alia Korot with BioRender.com. Modified from Pearson, 2019 (11).
previously found in relation to
different types of autobiographical
memory. People with an episodic (and thus more visual) style of
memory show stronger resting
state connectivity between important memory regions of the brain
and visual areas, while those with
a more factual style of memory
show greater connectivity between
those memory regions and prefrontal regions (5). These findings
suggest that there are intrinsic differences in brain connectivity underlying variations in the ability to
visualize. There are also differences
in brain activity, as hyperphantasic
individuals show more activation in
certain brain areas when asked to
visualize something, in comparison
to those with aphantasia (5).
While there have only been
a few brain imaging studies on
aphantasia so far, the findings have
led to some hypotheses about
what causes a lack of imagery.
One suggested neural mechanism
is reduced connectivity between
cognitive control systems and
the visual areas of the brain. This
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hypothesis is supported by the fact
that many aphantasics still experience visual dreams, an experience
in which the imagery is involuntary,
suggesting the disconnect is in the
voluntary generation of imagery
and not the imagery itself (5). This
is further supported by individuals
with aphantasia not having any difficulty with visual perception; they
are simply unable to voluntarily
create mental images.

Further Defining
Aphantasia
While there is much more
to discover about the neural underpinnings of visual imagery and
aphantasia, it is also important to
further define this phenomenon
and its variations. Is it a disorder, a
defined and discrete condition? Or
just a variation of the human experience, as one extreme end of a
continuous spectrum of visual imagery? There is not yet a scientific
consensus on this question, and

perhaps the answer does not really
matter for our understanding of
the phenomenon. Definitions will
always change, and we can work
to understand aphantasia regardless of its classification. There have
been reports and previous studies
of individuals losing their ability
to visualize after injury or disease
(known as acquired or neurogenic
aphantasia), but individuals with
congenital aphantasia (which
present at birth), like myself, do
not recall ever having the ability to
form mental images.
Since congenic aphantasia is present from birth, we must
consider the role of genetics in
this phenomenon. First degree
relatives seem to share aphantasia
much more often than would be
expected by chance, suggesting heritability which suggests
a potential genetic component
(2). Around 20% of people with
aphantasia are confident they have
other family members affected,
while nearly 50% are simply unsure
(7). Many people simply are not
aware of or do not discuss their
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differences in mental imagery,
suggesting that the occurrence of
shared aphantasia among relatives
could be significantly higher than
currently reported. This certainly implies a genetic contribution
towards aphantasia, and potentially a strong one, but much more
research is required to clarify the
strength and details of these genetics.
Another remaining question is whether aphantasia has multiple subtypes,given that people
differ on which types of sensory
imagery they lack. Some aphantasics lack only visual mental imagery, while others lack all forms of
imagery, including auditory, gustatory, and olfactory. Some researchers have suggested a separate
name, dysikonesia, for impaired
or absent imagery across multiple
senses, while reserving aphantasia
for the sole lack of visual imagery
(6). It remains to be seen whether
this term will be more widely adopted, or if aphantasia will simply
be generalized to all forms of
impaired sensory imagery.

Aphantasia’s Impact
on Other Cognitive
Processes
For those without aphantasia, mental imagery plays a strong
role in a variety of cognitive processes. This raises the question of
how aphantasia affects other abilities such as memory. The answer
seems to be that there are differences in recall and memory, but it
depends on the type of memory.
Those with aphantasia have equal
ability to successfully complete
declarative memory tests or even
visual working memory tasks
(involving using visual information
to complete a task). To complete
these tasks with no impairments
in capacity or accuracy means that

aphantasics must rely on different strategies, such as semantic,
meaning-based labels and verbal
cues rather than visual representations to process visual information
(10). These strategies are likely developed throughout life, and perhaps are not developed by those
who rely upon mental images. This
suggests that visual imagery and
working memory are two separate
processes, and mental imagery is
simply one possible tool that can
be used for interpreting and using
visual information.
There are some memory
tasks that do demonstrate differences between those with and
without aphantasia. For example,
in one study researchers presented images of real-world scenes to
individuals with aphantasia and
control participants without aphantasia, and then asked them to draw
the scenes from memory. Aphantasic individuals remembered
fewer objects, drew with less color,
and relied more on symbolic and
verbal representations by labeling
more objects with words. In contrast, their spatial accuracy in placing objects from the scene was the
same as controls (8). These results
support the idea that there are
separate memory systems for object versus spatial information, and
spatial recall is unimpaired in those
with aphantasia. Additionally,
despite the aphantasic individuals
in this study struggling to illustrate
a scene from memory, aphantasia
certainly does not preclude artistry. There are many self-identified
aphantasic visual artists that seem
to use strategies that are slightly
different from other artists (2).
Autobiographical memory, the memory of your own
past, is another area of potential
difference. Normally, many people experience their memories of
the past through intense, vivid,
and movie-like imagery. However, those with aphantasia do not

experience their memories in this
way. This lack of movie-like imagery seems to translate to diminished autobiographical memory.
People with aphantasia report a
significantly lower ability to recall
specific life events and have very
little ability to produce sensory
details while remembering events
(9). This difference in the ability to
remember details of your own past
is perhaps the biggest impact of
aphantasia, and certainly seems
to be a source of distress for many
who are aware of it. However,
as with other forms of memory,
it seems possible for those with
aphantasia to learn to rely on other
strategies and develop ways to
supplement their own memories.
If you cannot visualize and relive
your life events through imagery in
your mind, you thankfully have the
ever-present technology of photos
and videos to supplement your
own memories. Thus, the consequences of aphantasia certainly
do not seem too dire and can
be overcome with the breadth of
other strategies the human imagination is capable of.
For most people, visual
imagination is a central part of
their lives and seems an intrinsic
part of their cognitive experience.
As I have discussed my aphantasia
with friends and family, I am often
met with the reaction that they
cannot imagine a mind without
imagery. They cannot comprehend
how I think and remember and experience the world. Many authors
and philosophers over the years
have discussed how our vision of
our lives, our ability to imagine,
and our ability to represent things
in their absence is crucial to our
human experience—and perhaps
what sets us apart as humans.
However, these abilities do not
rely solely on visual imagery. It was
only in the last few years, when
I began discussing my cognitive
experience with others, that I
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discovered that I lack this internal
experience that most people rely
on. I have certainly never felt that
I was missing some necessary part
of cognition, and there are many
methods of internal representation
besides the visual or sensory.  
Aristotle once wrote that
“the soul never thinks without a
phantasm,” and he was (and is) far
from alone in the assumption that
illusory representations and mental imagery are intrinsic to human
thought. However, it seems Aristotle was in fact incorrect. He fell
into the trap that befalls so many
and assumed that his own internal
experience resembles all others.
Let us not underestimate the many
incredible multi-representational
abilities of the brain or forget the
representational powers of language. Visual imagery is simply
one tool in the toolbox of the human brain and lacking it does not
prevent the human cognitive experience. I feel I can speak for all
those with aphantasia when I say
that lacking the ability to visualize
does not preclude any complexity
of thought or feeling. In this case,
I will confidently counter Aristotle
and say that my soul certainly does
think without a phantasm.
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